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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2025-61920 — authlib

HIGHFix: authlib/authlib@867e3f8

CVE-2025-61920 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in authlib. A fix is available for authlib — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Authlib is vulnerable to Denial of Service via Oversized JOSE Segments

Also known asGHSA-pq5p-34cr-23v9PYSEC-2026-1203
Published
Oct 10, 2025
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-61920.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs49th percentile — riskier than 49% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2025-61920 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍authlib

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary Authlib’s JOSE implementation accepts unbounded JWS/JWT header and signature segments. A remote attacker can craft a token whose base64url‑encoded header or signature spans hundreds of megabytes. During verification, Authlib decodes and parses the full input before it is rejected, driving CPU and memory consumption to hostile levels and enabling denial of service.

Impact

  • Attack vector: unauthenticated network attacker submits a malicious JWS/JWT.

  • Effect: base64 decode + JSON/crypto processing of huge buffers pegs CPU and allocates large amounts of RAM; a single request can exhaust service capacity.

  • Observed behaviour: on a test host, the legacy code verified a 500 MB header, consuming ~4 GB RSS and ~9 s CPU before failing.

  • Severity: High. CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5).

Affected Versions Authlib ≤ 1.6.3 (and earlier) when verifying JWS/JWT tokens. Later snapshots with 256 KB header/signature limits are not affected.

Proof of concept

Local demo (do not run against third-party systems): Download jws_segment_dos_demo.py the PoC in direcotry authlib/ Run following Command

python3 jws_segment_dos_demo.py --variant both --sizes "500MB" --fork-per-case

Environment: Python 3.13.6, Authlib 1.6.4, Linux x86_64, CPUs=8 Sample output: Refined <img width="1295" height="306" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6dd8410f-bc36-4717-8cee-649bac9bf291" />

The compilation script prints separate “[ATTACKER]” (token construction) and “[SERVER]” (Authlib verification) RSS deltas so defenders can distinguish client-side preparation from server-side amplification. Regression tests authlib/tests/dos/test_jose_dos.py further capture the issue; the saved original_util.py/original_jws.py reproductions still accept the malicious payload.

Remediation

  • Apply the upstream patch that introduces decoded size limits:

  • MAX_HEADER_SEGMENT_BYTES = 256 KB

  • MAX_SIGNATURE_SEGMENT_BYTES = 256 KB

  • Enforce Limits in authlib/jose/util.extract_segment and _extract_signature.

  • Deploy the patched release immediately.

  • For additional defence in depth, reject JWS/JWT inputs above a few kilobytes at the proxy or WAF layer, and rate-limit verification endpoints.

Workarounds (temporary)

  • Enforce input size limits before handing tokens to Authlib.

  • Use application-level throttling to reduce amplification risk.

Resources

  • Demo script: jws_segment_dos_demo.py

  • Tests: authlib/tests/dos/test_jose_dos.py

  • OWASP JWT Cheat Sheet (DoS guidance)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIauthliball versions1.6.5pip install --upgrade 'authlib==1.6.5'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for authlib, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update authlib to 1.6.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-61920 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2025-61920 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2025-61920. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Quay 3.10quay/quay-rhel8:3.10.17-1764168428RHSA-2025:22182
Red Hat Quay 3.10quay/quay-rhel8:3.10.17-1765384144RHSA-2025:23064
Red Hat Quay 3.12quay/quay-rhel8:3.12-1765361593RHSA-2025:23028
Red Hat Quay 3.12quay/quay-rhel8:3.12-1765381502RHSA-2025:23059
Red Hat Quay 3.12quay/quay-rhel8:3.12-1765382602RHSA-2025:23060
Red Hat Quay 3.13quay/quay-rhel8:v3.13.10-1765782391RHSA-2025:23176
Red Hat Quay 3.14quay/quay-rhel8:1773097621RHSA-2026:4215
Red Hat Quay 3.9quay/quay-rhel8:3.9-1764254756RHSA-2025:22287

Frequently Asked Questions

**Summary** Authlib’s JOSE implementation accepts unbounded JWS/JWT header and signature segments. A remote attacker can craft a token whose base64url‑encoded header or signature spans hundreds of megabytes. During verification, Authlib decodes and parses the full input before it is rejected, driving CPU and memory consumption to hostile levels and enabling denial of service. **Impact** - Attack vector: unauthenticated network attacker submits a malicious JWS/JWT. - Effect: base64 decode + JSON/crypto processing of huge buffers pegs CPU and allocates large amounts of RAM; a single request c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-61920 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2025-61920 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2025-61920: authlib DoS (High 7.5) | O3 Security