CVE-2025-59353 — dragonfly
CVE-2025-59353 is a CWE-295 vulnerability in github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly. A fix is available for github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Manager generates mTLS certificates for arbitrary IP addresses
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-59353.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly🐹d7y.io/dragonfly/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A peer can obtain a valid TLS certificate for arbitrary IP addresses, effectively rendering the mTLS authentication useless. The issue is that the Manager’s Certificate gRPC service does not validate if the requested IP addresses “belong to” the peer requesting the certificate—that is, if the peer connects from the same IP address as the one provided in the certificate request.
if addr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok {
ip = addr.IP.String()
} else {
ip, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
// Parse csr.
[skipped]
// Check csr signature.
// TODO check csr common name and so on.
if err = csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
[skipped]
// TODO only valid for peer ip
// BTW we need support both of ipv4 and ipv6.
ips := csr.IPAddresses
if len(ips) == 0 {
// Add default connected ip.
ips = []net.IP{net.ParseIP(ip)}
}
Patches
- Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above.
Workarounds
There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading.
References
A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the full report.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [email protected].
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly | all versions | 2.1.0go get github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly@v2.1.0 |
| 🐹Go | d7y.io/dragonfly/v2 | all versions | 2.1.0go get d7y.io/dragonfly/v2@v2.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly to 2.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-59353 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2025-59353 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2025-59353. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-59353 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2025-59353 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.