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CVE-2025-54888 — @fedify/fedify

Fix: fedify-dev/fedify@14a2f8c

CVE-2025-54888 is a Improper Authentication vulnerability in @fedify/fedify. A fix is available for @fedify/fedify — see the affected versions and patch details below.

@fedify/fedify: Improper Authentication and Incorrect Authorization

Also known asGHSA-6jcc-xgcr-q3h4
Published
Updated
Affected
6 pkgs
Patched
6 / 6
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-54888.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.02%
Lower risk than most CVEs52th percentile — riskier than 52% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.40%0.80%1.21%0.1%0.7%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

6 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

20other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@fedify/fedifynpm
20Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

An authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances

Details

The vulnerability exists in handleInboxInternal function in fedify/federation/handler.ts. The critical flaw is in the order of operations:

  1. Line 1712: routeActivity() is called first, which processes the activity (either immediately or by adding to queue)
  2. Line 1730: Authentication check (doesActorOwnKey) happens AFTER processing
  // fedify/federation/handler.ts:1712-1750
  const routeResult = await routeActivity({  // ← Activity processed here
    context: ctx,
    json,
    activity,
    recipient,
    inboxListeners,
    inboxContextFactory,
    inboxErrorHandler,
    kv,
    kvPrefixes,
    queue,
    span,
    tracerProvider,
  });

  if (
    httpSigKey != null && !await doesActorOwnKey(activity, httpSigKey, ctx)  // ← Auth check too late
  ) {
    // Returns 401, but activity already processed
    return new Response("The signer and the actor do not match.", {
      status: 401,
      headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8" },
    });
  }

By the time the 401 response is returned, the malicious activity has already been processed or queued.

PoC

  1. Create an activity claiming to be from any actor:
  const maliciousActivity = {
    "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
    "type": "Create",
    "actor": "https://victim.example.com/users/alice",  // Impersonating victim
    "object": {
      "type": "Note",
      "content": "This is a forged message!"
    }
  }
  1. Sign the HTTP request with attacker's key (not the victim's):
  // Sign with attacker's key: https://attacker.com/users/eve#main-key
  const signedRequest = await signRequest(request, attackerPrivateKey, attackerKeyId);
  1. Send to any Fedify inbox - the activity will be processed despite the key mismatch.

Impact

Type: Authentication Bypass / Actor Impersonation

Who is impacted: All Fedify instances and their users

Consequences: Allows complete impersonation of any ActivityPub actor, enabling:

  • Sending fake posts/messages as any user
  • Creating/removing follows as any user
  • Boosting/sharing content as any user
  • Complete compromise of federation trust model

The vulnerability affects all Fedify instances but does not propagate to other ActivityPub implementations (Mastodon, etc.) which properly validate before processing.

Affected Packages

6 total 6 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@fedify/fedifyall versions1.3.20npm install @fedify/fedify@1.3.20
📦npm@fedify/fedify≥ 1.4.0-dev.585&&< 1.4.131.4.13npm install @fedify/fedify@1.4.13
📦npm@fedify/fedify≥ 1.5.0-dev.636&&< 1.5.51.5.5npm install @fedify/fedify@1.5.5
📦npm@fedify/fedify≥ 1.6.0-dev.754&&< 1.6.81.6.8npm install @fedify/fedify@1.6.8
📦npm@fedify/fedify≥ 1.7.0-pr.251.885&&< 1.7.91.7.9npm install @fedify/fedify@1.7.9
📦npm@fedify/fedify≥ 1.8.0-dev.909&&< 1.8.51.8.5npm install @fedify/fedify@1.8.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @fedify/fedify, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @fedify/fedify to 1.3.20 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-54888 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any ActivityPub actor by sending forged activities signed with their own keys. Activities are processed before verifying the signing key belongs to the claimed actor, enabling complete actor impersonation across all Fedify instances ### Details The vulnerability exists in handleInboxInternal function in fedify/federation/handler.ts. The critical flaw is in the order of operations: 1. Line 1712: routeActivity() is called first, which processes the activity (either immediately or by adding
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-54888 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2025-54888: @fedify/fedify — Fixed in 1.3.20