CVE-2024-55655 — sigstore
Fix: sigstore/sigstore-python@300b502CVE-2024-55655 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in sigstore. A fix is available for sigstore — see the affected versions and patch details below.
sigstore-python has insufficient validation of integration timestamp during verification
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-55655.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
sigstoreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
sigstore-python is a Python tool for generating and verifying Sigstore signatures. Versions of sigstore-python newer than 2.0.0 but prior to 3.6.0 perform insufficient validation of the "integration time" present in "v2" and "v3" bundles during the verification flow: the "integration time" is verified if a source of signed time (such as an inclusion promise) is present, but is otherwise trusted if no source of signed time is present. This does not affect "v1" bundles, as the "v1" bundle format always requires an inclusion promise.
Sigstore uses signed time to support verification of signatures made against short-lived signing keys. The impact and severity of this weakness is low, as Sigstore contains multiple other enforcing components that prevent an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp within a bundle from impersonating a valid signature. In particular, an attacker who modifies the integration timestamp can induce a Denial of Service, but in no different manner than already possible with bundle access (e.g. modifying the signature itself such that it fails to verify). Separately, an attacker could upload a new entry to the transparency service, and substitute their new entry's time. However, this would still be rejected at validation time, as the new entry's (valid) signed time would be outside the validity window of the original signing certificate and would nonetheless render the attacker auditable.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | sigstore | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 3.6.0 | 3.6.0pip install --upgrade 'sigstore==3.6.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sigstore, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update sigstore to 3.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-55655 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2024-55655 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2024-55655. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-55655 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2024-55655 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.