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🦀 crates.io

CVE-2024-40648

MEDIUM

`UserIdentity::is_verified` not checking verification status of own user identity while performing the check in matrix-rust-sdk

Also known asGHSA-4qg4-cvh2-crggRUSTSEC-2024-0356
Published
Jul 18, 2024
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk20th percentile+0.21%
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.78%0.0%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀matrix-sdk-crypto

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

matrix-rust-sdk is an implementation of a Matrix client-server library in Rust. The UserIdentity::is_verified() method in the matrix-sdk-crypto crate before version 0.7.2 doesn't take into account the verification status of the user's own identity while performing the check and may as a result return a value contrary to what is implied by its name and documentation. If the method is used to decide whether to perform sensitive operations towards a user identity, a malicious homeserver could manipulate the outcome in order to make the identity appear trusted. This is not a typical usage of the method, which lowers the impact. The method itself is not used inside the matrix-sdk-crypto crate. The 0.7.2 release of the matrix-sdk-crypto crate includes a fix. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iomatrix-sdk-cryptoall versions0.7.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for matrix-sdk-crypto. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update matrix-sdk-crypto to 0.7.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-40648 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2024-40648 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2024-40648. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

matrix-rust-sdk is an implementation of a Matrix client-server library in Rust. The `UserIdentity::is_verified()` method in the matrix-sdk-crypto crate before version 0.7.2 doesn't take into account the verification status of the user's own identity while performing the check and may as a result return a value contrary to what is implied by its name and documentation. If the method is used to decide whether to perform sensitive operations towards a user identity, a malicious homeserver could manipulate the outcome in order to make the identity appear trusted. This is not a typical usage of the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-40648 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2024-40648 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.