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CVE-2024-36402

MEDIUM

Unauthenticated writes to the media repository allow planting of problematic content in Matrix Media Repo

Also known asGHSA-8vmr-h7h5-cqhgGO-2025-3397
Published
Jan 16, 2025
Updated
Apr 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk40th percentile+0.47%
0.00%0.34%0.69%1.03%0.1%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Matrix Media Repo (MMR) is a highly configurable multi-homeserver media repository for Matrix. MMR before version 1.3.5 allows, by design, unauthenticated remote participants to trigger a download and caching of remote media from a remote homeserver to the local media repository. Such content then also becomes available for download from the local homeserver in an unauthenticated way. The implication is that unauthenticated remote adversaries can use this functionality to plant problematic content into the media repository. MMR 1.3.5 introduces a partial mitigation in the form of new endpoints which require authentication for media downloads. The unauthenticated endpoints will be frozen in a future release, closing the attack vector. Though extremely limited, server operators can use more strict rate limits based on IP address as a partial workaround.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repoall versions1.3.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo to 1.3.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-36402 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2024-36402 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2024-36402. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Matrix Media Repo (MMR) is a highly configurable multi-homeserver media repository for Matrix. MMR before version 1.3.5 allows, by design, unauthenticated remote participants to trigger a download and caching of remote media from a remote homeserver to the local media repository. Such content then also becomes available for download from the local homeserver in an unauthenticated way. The implication is that unauthenticated remote adversaries can use this functionality to plant problematic content into the media repository. MMR 1.3.5 introduces a partial mitigation in the form of new endpoints
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-36402 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2024-36402 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.