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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2024-32984 — yamux

HIGHFix: sigp/rust-yamux@6689e22

CVE-2024-32984 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in yamux. A fix is available for yamux — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Yamux Memory Exhaustion Vulnerability via Active::pending_frames property

Also known asGHSA-3999-5ffv-wp2r
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-32984.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.42%0.84%1.26%0.2%0.8%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀yamux

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Attack scenario The Rust implementation of the Yamux stream multiplexer uses a vector for pending frames. This vector is not bounded in length. Every time the Yamux protocol requires sending of a new frame, this frame gets appended to this vector. This can be remotely triggered in a number of ways, for example by:

  1. Opening a new libp2p Identify stream. This causes the node to send its Identify message. Of course, every other protocol that causes the sending of data also works. The larger the response, the more data is enqueued.
  2. Sending a Yamux Ping frame. This causes a Pong frame to be enqueued.

Under normal circumstances, this queue of pending frames would be drained once they’re sent out over the network. However, the attacker can use TCP’s receive window mechanism to prevent the victim from sending out any data: By not reading from the TCP connection, the receive window will never be increased, and the victim won’t be able to send out any new data (this is how TCP implements backpressure). Once this happens, Yamux’s queue of pending frames will start growing indefinitely. The queue will only be drained once the underlying TCP connection is closed.

Components https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux/blob/yamux-v0.13.1/yamux/src/connection.rs#L289

Details

This attack is inspired by the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack (CVE 2023-44487), HTTP/2 Ping Flood (CVE-2019-9512), and the QUIC Path Validation attack (see my blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2023-12-18-exploiting-quics-path-validation/).

Impact

An attacker can cause a remote node to run out of memory, which will result in the corresponding process getting terminated by the operating system.

Depending on the application protocols running on top of rust-libp2p, higher amplification factors are possible. For example, image a protocol that sends out 10 MB of data as a result of an incoming request. By issuing that request and sending a Yamux stream window update (together ~100-200 bytes), the victim would now enqueue the entire 10 MB into its frame buffer. Any block transfer / sync protocols might be good candidates.

In addition to consuming huge amounts of memory, this attack also drives up the victim's CPU load, such that the allocation of memory at some point becomes CPU-limited.

This was originally submitted by @marteen-seemann to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioyamux≥ 0.13.0&&< 0.13.20.13.2cargo update -p yamux --precise 0.13.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for yamux, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update yamux to 0.13.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-32984 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Attack scenario The Rust implementation of the Yamux stream multiplexer uses a vector for pending frames. This vector is not bounded in length. Every time the Yamux protocol requires sending of a new frame, this frame gets appended to this vector. This can be remotely triggered in a number of ways, for example by: 1. Opening a new libp2p Identify stream. This causes the node to send its Identify message. Of course, every other protocol that causes the sending of data also works. The larger the response, the more data is enqueued. 2. Sending a Yamux Ping frame. This causes a Pong
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-32984 in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2024-32984: yamux — Fixed in 0.13.2