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HIGH severity

CVE-2024-27299 — phpmyfaq

HIGHFix: thorsten/phpMyFAQ@1b68a5f

CVE-2024-27299 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) SQL Injection vulnerability in phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. 2 public exploit or proof-of-concept references are indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.

phpMyFAQ SQL Injection at "Save News"

Also known asGHSA-qgxx-4xv5-6hcw
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
2 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-27299.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs67th percentile — riskier than 67% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.63%1.55%2.48%3.40%2.1%1.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability has been discovered in the the "Add News" functionality due to improper escaping of the email address. This allows any authenticated user with the rights to add/edit FAQ news to exploit this vulnerability to exfiltrate data, take over accounts and in some cases, even achieve RCE.

Details

The vulnerable field lies in the authorEmail field which uses PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL filter. This filter is insufficient in protecting against SQL injection attacks and should still be properly escaped. However, in this version of phpMyFAQ (3.2.5), this field is not escaped properly can be used together with other fields to fully exploit the SQL injection vulnerability.

PoCs

4 PoCs are demonstrated here to illustrate the potential impacts.

PoC 1 - Postgres Time Based SQLi

  1. Login as admin or any user with the rights to view and save news.
  2. Navigate to "../phpmyfaq/admin/?action=news", click on "Add news", fill in some data, send and intercept the request.
  3. Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below: 3.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 3.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,1,1);select+pg_sleep(5)--". 3.3 - Set the rest of the fields as empty and send the request.
  4. Notice the 5s delay in the response time, indicating that the sleep function was executed, verifying the existence of the SQLi vulnerability. image

PoC 2 - SQLi to Read Data from PostgresDB

  1. Steps 1 and 2 are the same as PoC 1.
  2. Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below and send the request: 2.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 2.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,1,1);SELECT+remember_me+FROM+faquser+limit+1+offset+1%3b--". image (1)

PoC 3 - SQLi to Read Files from PostgresDB

  1. Steps 1 and 2 are the same as PoC 1.
  2. Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below and send the request: 2.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 2.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,(select+pg_read_file(CONCAT(CHR(67),CHR(58),CHR(92),CHR(87),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(100),CHR(111),CHR(119),CHR(115),CHR(92),CHR(119),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(46),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(105)))),1)--". (the CONCAT() and CHR() functions are used to bypass the escaping of single quotes, these characters in its decoded form is "select pg_read_file('C:\Windows\win.ini')") image (2)

PoC 4 - SQLi to Shell

It is also possible to obtain a shell if superuser is enabled on the postgres DB. These are the high level steps of the exploit chain:

  1. Create a table called "cmd_exec" to store the payload.
  2. Create a function in postgres to store the command to write a web shell to the "../htdocs" directory. (This step is required as CONCAT() function cannot be used to bypass the step where; "COPY cmd_exec FROM PROGRAM '<command>' " is run as it requires single quotes.)
  3. Trigger the function to write the PHP web shell at "http://<URL>/shell.php" that takes in commands via the "?cmd=" parameter.
  4. Send the Python reverse shell command via a GET request to launch the reverse shell.

The video demo and the Python PoC script can be accessed from this link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BFL8GHIBxSUxu0TneYf66KjFA0A4RZga?usp=sharing

Impact

The SQL injection vulnerability discovered in the "Add News" functionality of the application allows authenticated users with appropriate privileges to execute malicious SQL queries, potentially leading to data exfiltration, account takeover, and even remote code execution. Attackers can exploit the vulnerability to read sensitive data from the database, such as user credentials and system files, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the system. Moreover, successful exploitation may enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts or execute arbitrary commands on the server, impacting both system administrators and end users.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistphpmyfaq/phpmyfaq≥ 3.2.5&&< 3.2.63.2.6composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^3.2.6

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
phpmyfaqphpmyfaq
1 version
3.2.5
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 3.2.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-27299 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A SQL injection vulnerability has been discovered in the the "Add News" functionality due to improper escaping of the email address. This allows any authenticated user with the rights to add/edit FAQ news to exploit this vulnerability to exfiltrate data, take over accounts and in some cases, even achieve RCE. ### Details The vulnerable field lies in the `authorEmail` field which uses PHP's `FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL` filter. This filter is insufficient in protecting against SQL injection attacks and should still be properly escaped. However, in this version of phpMyFAQ (3.2.5), this
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2024-27299: phpmyfaq RCE — Fixed in 3.2.6