NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
.NET
.NET NuGet
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2024-24810 — wix

HIGHFix: wixtoolset/wix@fec38b6

CVE-2024-24810 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) CWE-426 vulnerability in wix. A fix is available for wix — see the affected versions and patch details below.

WiX is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges

Also known asGHSA-7wh2-wxc7-9ph5
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-24810.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.25%0.49%0.73%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
.NETwix.NETwix

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.

Details

If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/<bundle>.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.

PoC

As a standard, non-admin user:

  1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
  2. On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
  3. Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
  4. Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
  5. Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded

Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.

Impact

DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetwix≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.0.44.0.4dotnet add package wix --version 4.0.4
.NETNuGetwixall versions3.14.0dotnet add package wix --version 3.14.0

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
wix toolsetfiregiant
≥ 4.0.0 && < 4.0.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wix, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update wix to 4.0.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-24810 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges. ### Details If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the **.be/<bundle>.Local** folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges. ### PoC As a standard, non-admin user: 1. Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW 2. On FILE_
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2024-24810 in your dependencies?

Find it across NuGet, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2024-24810: wix — Fixed in 4.0.4