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CVE-2023-54397 — tornado

Fix: tornadoweb/tornado@b7a5dd2

CVE-2023-54397 is a CWE-444 vulnerability in tornado. A fix is available for tornado — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Tornado before 6.3.3 HTTP Request Smuggling via Content-Length

Also known asGHSA-qppv-j76h-2rpx
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-54397.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.88%0.4%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍tornado

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Tornado interprets -, +, and _ in chunk length and Content-Length values, which are not allowed by the HTTP RFCs. This can result in request smuggling when Tornado is deployed behind certain proxies that interpret those non-standard characters differently. This is known to apply to older versions of haproxy, although the current release is not affected.

Details

Tornado uses the int constructor to parse the values of Content-Length headers and chunk lengths in the following locations:

tornado/http1connection.py:445

            self._expected_content_remaining = int(headers["Content-Length"])

tornado/http1connection.py:621

                content_length = int(headers["Content-Length"])  # type: Optional[int]

tornado/http1connection.py:671

            chunk_len = int(chunk_len_str.strip(), 16)

Because int("0_0") == int("+0") == int("-0") == int("0"), using the int constructor to parse and validate strings that should contain only ASCII digits is not a good strategy.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPItornadoall versions6.3.3pip install --upgrade 'tornado==6.3.3'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tornado, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tornado to 6.3.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-54397 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatCritical

A vulnerability was found in Tornado's HTTP header parsing logic. When deployed behind a front-end reverse proxy or load balancer, Tornado improperly accepts non-standard characters in Content-Length headers instead of rejecting the malformed request. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this parsing…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Configure upstream reverse proxies or load balancers to strictly normalize or sanitize HTTP headers and reject malformed Content-Length headers before requests reach the Tornado application layer.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2023-54397 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Tornado interprets `-`, `+`, and `_` in chunk length and `Content-Length` values, which are not allowed by the HTTP RFCs. This can result in request smuggling when Tornado is deployed behind certain proxies that interpret those non-standard characters differently. This is known to apply to older versions of haproxy, although the current release is not affected. ## Details Tornado uses the `int` constructor to parse the values of `Content-Length` headers and chunk lengths in the following locations: ### `tornado/http1connection.py:445` ```python3 self._expected_content_r
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2023-54397: tornado — Fixed in 6.3.3