CVE-2023-51649 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.5) CWE-863 vulnerability in nautobot. A fix is available for nautobot — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Nautobot missing object-level permissions enforcement when running Job Buttons
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
nautobot🐍nautobotReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level extras.run_job permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (/extras/job-button/<uuid>/run/) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.
Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of
JobButtonReceivercan be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically toJobButtonReceiversubclasses.
Additionally, although the documentation states that both extras.run_job permission and extras.run_jobbutton permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the extras.run_jobbutton permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the extras.run_jobbutton permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including JobButtonReceiver subclasses) via the normal "Job Run" UI, so after some discussion, we've decided that the extras.run_jobbutton permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for extras.run_jobbutton and all other references to the extras.run_jobbutton permission, rather than adding enforcement of this previously unenforced permission.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 (https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4995) and 2.1.0 (https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/4993)
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Partial mitigation can be achieved by auditing JobButtonReceiver subclasses defined in the system and restricting which users are permitted to create or edit JobButton records.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | nautobot | ≥ 1.5.14&&< 1.6.8 | 1.6.8pip install --upgrade 'nautobot==1.6.8' |
| 🐍PyPI | nautobot | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.1.0 | 2.1.0pip install --upgrade 'nautobot==2.1.0' |
Affected Products
nautobotnetworktocodeDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nautobot, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update nautobot to 1.6.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-51649 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-51649 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.