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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2023-38697 — protocol-http1

MEDIUMFix: socketry/protocol-http1@e11fc16

CVE-2023-38697 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.8) CWE-444 vulnerability in protocol-http1. A fix is available for protocol-http1 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

protocol-http1 HTTP Request/Response Smuggling vulnerability

Also known asGHSA-6jwc-qr2q-7xwj
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-38697.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.42%0.84%1.25%0.2%0.8%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💎protocol-http1

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

RFC 9112 Section 7.1 defined the format of chunk size, chunk data and chunk extension (detailed ABNF is in Appendix section).

In summary:

  • The value of Content-Length header should be a string of 0-9 digits.
  • The chunk size should be a string of hex digits and should split from chunk data using CRLF.
  • The chunk extension shouldn't contain any invisible character.

However, we found that Falcon has following behaviors while disobey the corresponding RFCs.

  • Falcon accepts Content-Length header values that have "+" prefix.
  • Falcon accepts Content-Length header values that written in hexadecimal with "0x" prefix.
  • Falcon accepts "0x" and "+" prefixed chunk size.
  • Falcon accepts LF in chunk extension.

This behavior can lead to desync when forwarding through multiple HTTP parsers, potentially results in HTTP request smuggling and firewall bypassing. Note that while these issues were reproduced in Falcon (the server), the issue is with protocol-http1 which implements the HTTP/1 protocol parser. We have not yet been advised of any real world exploit or practical attack.

Patches

Fixed in protocol-http1 v0.15.1+.

Workarounds

None.

References

https://github.com/socketry/protocol-http1/pull/20

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsprotocol-http1all versions0.15.1bundle update protocol-http1 --conservative

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
protocol-http1socketry
< 0.15.1
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for protocol-http1, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update protocol-http1 to 0.15.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-38697 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact [RFC 9112 Section 7.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112#name-chunked-transfer-coding) defined the format of chunk size, chunk data and chunk extension (detailed ABNF is in Appendix section). In summary: - The value of Content-Length header should be a string of 0-9 digits. - The chunk size should be a string of hex digits and should split from chunk data using CRLF. - The chunk extension shouldn't contain any invisible character. However, we found that Falcon has following behaviors while disobey the corresponding RFCs. - Falcon accepts Content-Length header values that h
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-38697 in your dependencies?

Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2023-38697: protocol-http1 — Fixed in 0.15.1