CVE-2023-34093 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.8) Information Exposure vulnerability in @strapi/strapi. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for @strapi/strapi — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Strapi allows actors to make all attributes on a content-type public without noticing it
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-34093.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@strapi/strapinpm@strapi/utilsnpm@strapi/databasenpmDescription
Summary
Anyone (Strapi developers, users, plugins) can make every attribute of a Content-Type public without knowing it.
Details
When dealing with content-types inside a Strapi instance, we can extend those using the appropriate container:
strapi.container.get('content-types').extend(contentTypeUID, (contentType) => newContentType);
The vulnerability only affects the handling of content types by Strapi, not the actual content types themselves. Users can use plugins or modify their own content types without realizing that the privateAttributes getter is being removed, which can result in any attribute becoming public. This can lead to sensitive information being exposed or the entire system being taken control of by an attacker(having access to password hashes).
PoC
Extend any content type on runtime (like in the bootstrap functions) and do a copy of the content-type object.
strapi.container.get('content-types').extend(contentTypeUID, (contentType) => {
const newCT = { ... contentType, attributes: { ...contentType.attributes, newAttr: {} } };
return newCT;
});
This will have as effect to remove the getter and as we rely on it in sanitization, every attributes will be considered as public.
Impact
Everyone can be impacted. Depending on how people are using/extending content-types. If the users are mutating the content-type, they will not be affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @strapi/strapi | all versions | 4.10.8npm install @strapi/strapi@4.10.8 |
| 📦npm | @strapi/utils | all versions | 4.10.8npm install @strapi/utils@4.10.8 |
| 📦npm | @strapi/database | all versions | 4.10.8npm install @strapi/database@4.10.8 |
Affected Products
strapistrapiResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @strapi/strapi, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @strapi/strapi to 4.10.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-34093 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-34093 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.