How severe is CVE-2022-3102?

No CVSS score has been assigned to CVE-2022-3102 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2022-3102?

CVE-2022-3102 affects the following packages: jwcrypto (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix CVE-2022-3102?

Update jwcrypto to 1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-3102 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2022-3102 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jwcrypto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2022-3102 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is CVE-2022-3102 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2022-3102 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was CVE-2022-3102 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2022-3102 was published on September 21, 2022 and was last updated on July 7, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

CVE-2022-3102: jwcrypto Auth Bypass

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐍jwcrypto

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The JWT code can auto-detect the type of token being provided, and this can lead the application to incorrect conclusions about the trustworthiness of the token. Quoting the private disclosure we received : "Under certain circumstances, it is possible to substitute a [..] signed JWS with a JWE that is encrypted with the public key that is normally used for signature validation." This substitution attack can occur only if the validating application also have access to the private key, normally used to sign the tokens, available during validation of the received JWT. The significance of this attacks depends on the use of the token, it may lead to authentication bypass or authorization bypass (respectively if claims are used to authenticate or authorize certain actions), because the attacker has full control of the data placed in the JWE and can inject any desired claim value.

Several mitigating factors exist that can protect applications from this issue:

If the private key corresponding to the public key used to encrypt the JWE is not available to the application an exception will be raised.
If the JWK is specified with the 'use' parameter set to 'sig' (as expected for keys used only for signing/verification) an exception will be raised.
If the JWK is specified with the 'key_ops' parameter set and it does not include the 'decrypt' operation an exception will be raised.
Applications may check the token type before validation, in this case they would fail to detect an expected JWS

Normally, signing and validation are done by different applications, so this scenario should be unlikely. However it is possible to have applications that both sign and validate tokens and do not separate JWKs in use, or do not set a JWK 'use' type.

Due to the mitigating factors, and the fact that specific operational constraints and conditions need to be in place to successfully exploit this issue to generate an authentication bypass, we rate this security issue as moderate. Other avenues may decide on a different rating based on use case, always verify what conditions apply to your use of the library to assess risk.

Many thanks to Tom Tervoort of Secura for finding and reporting this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`jwcrypto`	all versions	1.4`pip install --upgrade 'jwcrypto==1.4'`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jwcrypto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update jwcrypto to 1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2022-3102 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

The JWT code can auto-detect the type of token being provided, and this can lead the application to incorrect conclusions about the trustworthiness of the token. Quoting the private disclosure we received : "Under certain circumstances, it is possible to substitute a [..] signed JWS with a JWE that is encrypted with the public key that is normally used for signature validation." This substitution attack can occur only if the validating application also have access to the private key, normally used to sign the tokens, available during validation of the received JWT. The significance of this att

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2022-3102 — jwcrypto