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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2021-32720 — sylius

MEDIUMFix: Sylius/Sylius@21d5098

CVE-2021-32720 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in sylius/sylius. A fix is available for sylius/sylius — see the affected versions and patch details below.

List of order ids, number, items total and token value exposed for unauthorized uses via new API

Also known asGHSA-rpxh-vg2x-526v
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.46%0.92%1.38%0.2%0.9%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2021-32720 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,987 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘sylius/sylius

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Part of the details (order ID, order number, items total, and token value) of all placed orders were exposed to unauthorized users. If exploited properly, a few additional information like the number of items in the cart and the date of the shipping may be fetched as well. This data seems to not be crucial nor is personal data, however, could be used for sociotechnical attacks or may expose a few details about shop condition to the third parties. The data possible to aggregate are the number of processed orders or their value in the moment of time.

Patches

The problem has been patched at Sylius 1.9.5 and 1.10.0

Workarounds

There are a few ways to fix this without updating the code.

The first possible solution is to hide the problematic endpoints behind the firewall from not logged in users. In order to achieve it one has to add the configuration in config/packages/security.yaml:

    access_control:
        # ... 
        - { path: "%sylius.security.new_api_shop_regex%/orders", role: IS_AUTHENTICATED_ANONYMOUSLY, methods: [POST] }
        - { path: "%sylius.security.new_api_shop_regex%/orders", role: ROLE_USER, methods: [GET] }

This would put only the order list under the firewall and allow only authorized users to access it. Once a user is authorized, it will have access to theirs orders only.

The second possible solution is to decorate the \Sylius\Bundle\ApiBundle\Doctrine\QueryCollectionExtension\OrdersByLoggedInUserExtension and throw Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Exception\AccessDeniedException if the class is executed for unauthorized user.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsylius/sylius≥ 1.9.0&&< 1.9.51.9.5composer require sylius/sylius:^1.9.5

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
syliussylius
≥ 1.9.0 && < 1.9.5
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sylius/sylius, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update sylius/sylius to 1.9.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2021-32720 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Part of the details (order ID, order number, items total, and token value) of all placed orders were exposed to unauthorized users. If exploited properly, a few additional information like the number of items in the cart and the date of the shipping may be fetched as well. This data seems to not be crucial nor is personal data, however, could be used for sociotechnical attacks or may expose a few details about shop condition to the third parties. The data possible to aggregate are the number of processed orders or their value in the moment of time. ### Patches The problem has be
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2021-32720: sylius — Fixed in 1.9.5