base58-check-helperRubyGems
Advisory published Updated
base58-check-helper is a confirmed malicious RubyGems package (MAL-2026-17580) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in base58-check-helper (RubyGems)
What this malware does
RubyGems runs this gem's native extension script ext/base58-check-helper/extconf.rb during gem install. The script exits without action on CI runners and sandboxes, based on CI environment variables, the hostname, the username and the working directory. It continues if the system uptime is over 30 minutes and the home directory holds .ssh, .gitconfig, .npmrc, .gem/credentials or .bundle. It then decodes a Base64 Ruby payload and forks twice into a detached process. After 20 to 40 minutes the payload downloads http://45.138.12.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz to /tmp/.w1.tgz with curl, extracts it to /tmp/.w1/, runs wg_install.sh with bash and deletes both. The payload stores the URL XOR-encoded with the key usv\x9a. The Ruby code in lib/ is a decoy. The RubyGems account reqthrottle_3474 published this gem and 41 others with the same loader on 2026-10-05.
The gem's ext/base58-check-helper/extconf.rb runs during gem install and, before invoking create_makefile, performs anti-analysis gating: it skips execution when CI environment variables are present, when the hostname looks ephemeral, when the username looks synthetic, when the working path matches /tmp, /opt/rubygems, or /workspace, when machine uptime is under 1800 seconds, or when common developer dotfiles are absent. When those checks indicate a real developer workstation (presence of ~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gem/credentials, or ~/.bundle), it base64-decodes an embedded Ruby payload and eval's it inside a double-forked, Process.setsid-daemonized child. The decoded payload reconstructs a URL by XOR-ing a hex blob against the key bytes of "usv\x9a", then uses curl to download an unpinned tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz, extracts it to /tmp/.w1, and executes bash /tmp/.w1/wg_install.sh. The native source accompanying the extension is a two-line empty stub, so the extension exists solely as a vehicle for the dropper. The combination of base64+XOR obfuscation, hidden /tmp staging, developer-machine targeting, sandbox/CI evasion, and daemonized execution of remote shell content is a credential-stealer dropper fingerprint.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'base58-check-helper' @ 1.0.0 (rubygems) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for base58-check-helper (version 1.0.0).
If you installed it — respond
base58-check-helper is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If base58-check-helper was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks base58-check-helper-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.