Which versions of zip-me are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of zip-me are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate zip-me if I installed it?

zip-me is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed zip-me — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If zip-me was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is zip-me part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — zip-me is associated with the 2024-12-langer-updater campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find zip-me across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zip-me (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zip-me across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

zip-mePyPI

Malicious code in zip-me (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-12372

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall zip-me

What this malware does

During installation, the package collects quite extensive information about the host and has no other purpose. To avoid detection, the real code is put in a ZIP archive and includes also some VM-detection techniques. The malicious code is activated via metaclass set for the "install" command class in setup.py

Over the time, techniques used in packages are slightly changing, including that some of marked packages don't have malicious part, but rather are used only for tests.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-12-langer-updater

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
exfiltration-env-variables
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6b763aac9c3289793f05864636936ac4d9ac596dc95dd3ad1c510128667f2173

4ae48b0e5e3d93cee49e83f0bfa47a43f02ede60914545d0d82204c6664fde6f

52354eb7c46bfb3f4c37bb90ded0d0815f7274284efcacc85d862ccd0296a6f4

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for zip-me (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging zip-me across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
zip-me is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If zip-me was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks zip-me before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. zip-me on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-12-langer-updater

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)

Detect & block this

O3 blocks zip-me-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring