What does the workingitmehelpit malware do?

Package installs malware identified as a backdoor or reverse shell. Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-05-workingitmehelpit Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. - malware - backdoor The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'workingitmehelpit' @ 1.0.0 (pypi) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Which versions of workingitmehelpit are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of workingitmehelpit are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate workingitmehelpit if I installed it?

workingitmehelpit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed workingitmehelpit — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If workingitmehelpit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is workingitmehelpit part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — workingitmehelpit is associated with the 2026-05-workingitmehelpit campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find workingitmehelpit across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for workingitmehelpit (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging workingitmehelpit across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

workingitmehelpitPyPI

Malicious code in workingitmehelpit (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3664

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall workingitmehelpit

What this malware does

Package installs malware identified as a backdoor or reverse shell.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-workingitmehelpit

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
malware
backdoor

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'workingitmehelpit' @ 1.0.0 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3e553fe0eea72dc43eab2696330acd6fbb3e4de8c95529eab6298411620c0c9f

38ea8dff9ef464eabbfbc1eacd769a90c65a53097308c1b76c2529b037e2041b

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for workingitmehelpit (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging workingitmehelpit across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
workingitmehelpit is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If workingitmehelpit was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks workingitmehelpit before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. workingitmehelpit on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-05-workingitmehelpit

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks workingitmehelpit-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring