Which versions of win32evtlog are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of win32evtlog are flagged malicious: 0.0.1, 0.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate win32evtlog if I installed it?

win32evtlog is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed win32evtlog — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If win32evtlog was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is win32evtlog part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — win32evtlog is associated with the 2025-06-diar-ai-basic campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find win32evtlog across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for win32evtlog (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging win32evtlog across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

win32evtlogPyPI

Malicious code in win32evtlog (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2025-191933

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall win32evtlog

What this malware does

Research packages targeting typosquatting and dependency confusions, without really harmful behaviour - just calling home through DNS resolver.

Related to 2025-06-stubsout (using the same remote domain), but without dangerous activity

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2025-06-diar-ai-basic

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.0.10.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6c5364d8fa6015cfdc19b75114951f92b670a911576ea4f4ab8593ba914d4211

4aba891520e5d5ae607dd5069c1f70512a339cbfeca374b680328cf1e406d3ad

c8a8f875d73bd7e2db081036141b9f935908bff09c4158336e1f89d6ed2842f3

c3753af620e30d6ee20a9ee396d4a692666ffe12d2ad033a07abb0bfceca7bac

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for win32evtlog (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging win32evtlog across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
win32evtlog is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If win32evtlog was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks win32evtlog before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. win32evtlog on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.1, 0.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2025-06-diar-ai-basic

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)

Detect & block this

O3 blocks win32evtlog-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring