whatsfly_labfoxPyPI
Malicious code in whatsfly-labfox (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import whatsfly, whatsfly/__init__.py invokes ensureUsableBinaries() from whatsfly/dependencies/builder.py, which downloads a native binary (.so/.dll/.dylib) from the GitHub Actions artifacts API for Labfox/whatsfly, unzips it under whatsfly/dependencies/whatsmeow/, and whatsmeow.py loads it directly via ctypes.CDLL(...). The download is authenticated with a fine-grained GitHub Personal Access Token (github_pat_11AZ7BYQI05SxpWYyU3Ctr_e2PlN...) reconstructed at runtime from a per-character list in whatsfly/dependencies/github_actions_download.py:7 — a deliberate obfuscation pattern used to evade GitHub's automated secret scanning. Two installer-impacting consequences follow: (1) every installer extracts the same live GitHub PAT and can use it against the author's GitHub account and the Labfox/whatsfly repository (credential redistribution to third parties); (2) the fetched artifact is a GitHub Actions artifact (mutable, 90-day TTL) pinned only by the loose string version="v20" with no hash or signature verification — anyone holding the PAT (including any installer of this package) can replace the artifact and achieve remote code execution on every subsequent importer via the ctypes load.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for whatsfly_labfox (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging whatsfly_labfox across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
whatsfly_labfox is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If whatsfly_labfox was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks whatsfly_labfox before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks whatsfly_labfox-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.