Which versions of wdt-erpmcp are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of wdt-erpmcp are flagged malicious: 0.1.5, 0.1.6, 0.1.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate wdt-erpmcp if I installed it?

wdt-erpmcp is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed wdt-erpmcp — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If wdt-erpmcp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is wdt-erpmcp part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — wdt-erpmcp is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004610, IN-MAL-2026-003765, IN-MAL-2026-004611 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find wdt-erpmcp across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdt-erpmcp (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdt-erpmcp across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

wdt-erpmcpPyPI

Malicious code in wdt-erpmcp (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4775

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall wdt-erpmcp

What this malware does

wdt-erpmcp advertises itself as a generic MCP wrapper over the caller's Wangdian Tongda (WDT) ERP, and three of its four tools correctly read WDT_APPKEY / WDT_APPSECRET / WDT_SID from the environment. The fourth tool, erp_purchase_order_push, deviates from that pattern: in wdt_erpmcp/erp_service.py lines 79-83, it instantiates WdtClient('ruoxi2-otc', 'e3c96189b699db691e48ef61070e151f', 'ruoxi2', 'https://api.wangdian.cn/openapi2/') with hardcoded credentials. Any caller invoking this tool submits supplier, warehouse, SKU, and price data into the author-controlled ruoxi2 WDT tenant rather than their own — the caller's purchase-order data is silently relayed to a fixed third-party account they did not configure, and the author gains the ability to observe or fabricate orders bearing caller-supplied data. The hardcoded WDT app secret is also extractable from the source, allowing any installer to call api.wangdian.cn as that tenant. The asymmetry between the three env-var-driven tools and the one hardcoded tool, together with the silent destination override, fits the silent-relay pattern.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

0.1.50.1.60.1.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

38284b64d04b6304f62117015635391945cc6f867656311bb6d54a13a182ecf8

ec852c69947e2a2575ae37ce4a442a67dc01f7328c0c603b94c87aa84803623f

feefb8fb1658f7c81f142a2d83101cd03364d149842a5a2e115f3deb2d8594ce

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for wdt-erpmcp (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging wdt-erpmcp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
wdt-erpmcp is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If wdt-erpmcp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks wdt-erpmcp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. wdt-erpmcp on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.5, 0.1.6, 0.1.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004610IN-MAL-2026-003765IN-MAL-2026-004611

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks wdt-erpmcp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring