voxcpmui3PyPI
Advisory published Updated
voxcpmui3 is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-17464) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in voxcpmui3 (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a text-to-speech inference harness but contains no TTS code. On calling the exported Harness.run, the module chmods +x and spawns a bundled ~8MB native binary at bin/voxcpm-core with a JSON config whose fields match a stratum mining pool (url/user/pass/keepalive/tls under a dict key, cpu.threads, cpu.mem-locked, cache-budget). The miner's pool-list key is assembled by string concatenation ("po"+"ols") rather than written as a literal, an evasion of static scanners that search for the literal key. A ~40MB cloudflared binary is also bundled and invoked as cloudflared access tcp --hostname <edge> --url 127.0.0.1:<port>, so the native core connects to loopback while traffic is tunneled through a Cloudflare-Access-protected hostname chosen by the caller — concealing the mining pool destination from network egress monitoring. The harness emits fabricated step/loss/tok-s progress lines generated from a seeded random.Random to maintain the training cover story. The combined effect is that installers who follow the README donate CPU cycles to the author's mining pool while the destination is obscured behind a tunneling binary.
The package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-voxeval
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for voxcpmui3 (version 0.1.0).
If you installed it — respond
voxcpmui3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If voxcpmui3 was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks voxcpmui3-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.