voxcpmtts3PyPI
Advisory published Updated
voxcpmtts3 is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-17463) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in voxcpmtts3 (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a text-to-speech inference library but ships two bundled binaries that implement a cryptojacking payload. voxcpmtts3/bin/voxcpm-core is XMRig (contains Monero/RandomX/CryptoNight/stratum/Hashrate/DONATE strings); harness.run() chmods it executable and spawns it via subprocess.Popen with a JSON config whose top-level key is assembled by string concatenation ("po"+"ols") to evade static analysis, carrying stratum-protocol fields (user/pass/keepalive/tls). A second bundled binary, voxcpmtts3/bin/cloudflared (~40MB), is launched with 'access tcp --hostname <edge> --url 127.0.0.1:<port>' to open a raw TCP tunnel through Cloudflare Access, hiding the real mining pool address behind a Cloudflare Access hostname and defeating destination-based blocking; a code comment acknowledges the design is to keep the traffic readable at the Cloudflare front door. In parallel, self._hb() POSTs run_id, state, Python tracebacks (up to 4000 chars) and timestamps to https://<edge>/hb through the same attacker-controlled Cloudflare Access hostname, giving the operator a per-victim telemetry channel that also leaks local filesystem paths from error traces. The 'TTS inference', 'coordinator', and 'step/loss/tok/s' terminology in code and README is cover for stratum mining pool concepts.
The package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-voxeval
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for voxcpmtts3 (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
voxcpmtts3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If voxcpmtts3 was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks voxcpmtts3-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.