Which versions of user-rand-agnt-user are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of user-rand-agnt-user are flagged malicious: 1.8.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate user-rand-agnt-user if I installed it?

user-rand-agnt-user is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed user-rand-agnt-user — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If user-rand-agnt-user was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is user-rand-agnt-user part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — user-rand-agnt-user is associated with the RLMA-2024-11200, 2024-10-fake-usreagent, RLUA-2026-00875 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find user-rand-agnt-user across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for user-rand-agnt-user (version 1.8.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging user-rand-agnt-user across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

user-rand-agnt-userPyPI

Malicious code in user-rand-agnt-user (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-11739

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall user-rand-agnt-user

What this malware does

Inside the library there is a part running code hidden in the attached image, which then exfiltrate user-provided data, downloads and install next stage code, exfiltrate TXT files and finally installs infostealers - Lumma and a custom one. Arround L110

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2024-10-fake-usreagent

Reasons (based on the campaign):

infostealer
files-exfiltration
clipboard-stealing
obfuscation
clones-real-package
action-hidden-in-lib-usage

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.8.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

fe2904aeccfe9ed0e3ad9b02ecc3ab9a107e2cfa67f2721e976f1ea0c062bca1

0809abbc20077a82ad7a53a9093e32796a9dbdc282a5fc0d05769185e80792b0

e5b1f023c010c55afb11b349054c1180303197e0d411176b276d26574d891702

f2d0eb38375e8b715575d29bb1494d3ea47d4cc6a85b678b23a9598acdcffbe4

f4bf6fa169e889bf9ab40b0fe4b608643b77849f54f4a75864536c6d497918a7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for user-rand-agnt-user (version 1.8.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging user-rand-agnt-user across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
user-rand-agnt-user is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If user-rand-agnt-user was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks user-rand-agnt-user before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. user-rand-agnt-user on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.8.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

RLMA-2024-112002024-10-fake-usreagentRLUA-2026-00875

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks user-rand-agnt-user-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring