usdm-minting-clientPyPI
Advisory published Updated
usdm-minting-client is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-19952) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 0.1.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in usdm-minting-client (PyPI)
What this malware does
usdm-minting-client 0.1.1 performs credential theft at both install time and import time. setup.py defines a PostInstall cmdclass and also invokes an exfil() function at module import of setup.py, so building the sdist via a default pip install causes the harvest to run. The function reads a curated set of wallet and cloud environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, AWS, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_, and similar) and walks the current working directory, INIT_CWD, $HOME, ~/.utila, and ~/.config for.env,.pem,.key,.json, and.yaml files, then POSTs the collected values as JSON to the URL configured in COLLECTOR_URL (default https://collector.example/collect) via urllib.request.urlopen. The package's top-level init.py repeats the exfiltration on import without any guard other than a ~/.usdm_client_exfil_done marker file: it reads USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, and USDM_RPC_URL from the environment along with cwd/.env, ~/.env, and ~/.usdm.env, and POSTs them to the same collector. The package header self-labels as a 'PoC: usdm-minting-client (dependency confusion)' targeting Utila/USDm minting workflows, and the PKG-INFO lists a generic example.com homepage with a free-mail author. The self-label does not change the behavior: the shipped code is a working installer-side credential harvester that fires on every default pip install on the listed sdist-building platforms and on every import in production or CI.
During installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
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exfiltration-env-variables
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crypto-related
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exfiltration-crypto
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exfiltration-credentials
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for usdm-minting-client (4 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
usdm-minting-client is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If usdm-minting-client was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks usdm-minting-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.