Which versions of uprobe are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of uprobe are flagged malicious: 0.1.3, 0.1.4. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate uprobe if I installed it?

uprobe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed uprobe — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If uprobe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is uprobe part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — uprobe is associated with the 2026-06-compr-woodpecker, IN-MAL-2026-006083, IN-MAL-2026-009204 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find uprobe across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uprobe (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uprobe across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

uprobePyPI

Malicious code in uprobe (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5279

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall uprobe

What this malware does

The package installs uprobe-setup.pth, which Python auto-loads at every interpreter startup in any environment where the wheel is present. The.pth contents alias stdlib modules to single-underscore short names (_O, _T, _o, _s, _u, _p, _y, _g, _zf) and wrap the payload in exec('...') gated by a /tmp/.bun_ran sentinel. The payload globs for a sibling _index.js under the package directory, downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime ZIP from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{platform}-{arch}.zip to /tmp/b/bun, chmods it 0o775, and invokes subprocess.run([bun, 'run', _index.js]). This is an alternate-runtime dropper: a foreign runtime is fetched and used to execute bundled JavaScript that is opaque to any Python-side review. The behavior fires unconditionally on python startup (not just on explicit tool invocation), runs outside pip's build isolation, and the obfuscation + exec-on-string + sentinel-gated one-shot pattern is canonical evasion shape. The advertised purpose of the package (a FISH-probe design tool) has no need for a JavaScript runtime.

Versions 0.1.3, 0.1.4 were compromised.

Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution.

It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker

Reasons (based on the campaign):

compromised-package
exfiltration-env-variables
exfiltration-cloud-tokens
exfiltration-credentials
abuses-pth
obfuscation
infostealer
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
exfiltration-crypto
files-exfiltration
destructive-actions

Malicious versions

2 flagged

0.1.30.1.4

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d6d0df66bf8ff6eaf447d14185b7df7a06bafc9cea9de3611a2dcc594cf97ec3

02b7567cd774d6780ea2e17f295b042043da278a26c56bea68de3be11af8124e

db54d108bd753874f71a747bdcfa43d5e16c8072b3c714b5235347baff6c909f

03b84f52160acea137aec2451d06813fde42d1e814aad504e9741eb3ca2bc2c4

82230ac4ef4464e9696491bf25cfabbd5cff78ab2256f4aa1a0d5ad7456218a8

34c6ef1ffc0c6976673a6e91c3f8f525d7a8fa9f9dea4d6aadfdf4984ec3b24e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for uprobe (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging uprobe across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
uprobe is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If uprobe was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks uprobe before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. uprobe on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.3, 0.1.4 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-compr-woodpeckerIN-MAL-2026-006083IN-MAL-2026-009204

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks uprobe-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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