ue-python-toolsPyPI
Malicious code in ue-python-tools (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import ue_python_tools, the package spawns a background thread that issues an HTTP POST to http://109.123.247.172/pypi carrying a JSON payload composed of the installer's hostname (socket.gethostname()), user identity (os.environ USER/USERNAME), and current working directory (os.getcwd()). The destination is a hardcoded plaintext bare-IP endpoint with no user consent, no configuration surface, and no documented purpose. The package metadata compounds the risk: it is published as version 99999.0.0 with placeholder author 'Security Research' and summary 'Internal package', a version-squat shape designed to be resolved as the 'latest' release by dependency resolvers and to shadow an internal package name via dependency confusion. Installing or importing this package causes installer host identifiers to be transmitted off-machine to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ue-python-tools (version 99999.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ue-python-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ue-python-tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ue-python-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ue-python-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ue-python-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.