txdpyPyPI
Malicious code in txdpy (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package exports a 发送邮件 (send_email) function whose default sender, recipient, and SMTP auth code are hardcoded to the author's QQ account. In txdpy/发送邮件.py lines 14-17, sender_email defaults to '[email protected]', receiver_email defaults to '[email protected]', and password defaults to the embedded QQ SMTP authorization code. A caller invoking this documented API with the minimal signature (subject and body only) silently delivers their message content to the author's inbox via smtp.qq.com using the author's credentials — the API's advertised purpose (generic email sending) does not match its actual behavior (relaying to a fixed author-controlled mailbox). The function is re-exported from init.py, making it part of the package's public surface. Additionally, txdpy/翻译.py:18-20 ships the author's Baidu Translate API credentials (appid 20220712001270949 + secret_key) — author self-harm rather than installer harm, but corroborates a pattern of careless credential handling. A separate quality issue: pyndjs.py:74 evaluates os.popen('where node') as a function default argument, causing shell execution at import time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for txdpy (version 2026.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging txdpy across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
txdpy is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If txdpy was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks txdpy before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks txdpy-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.