testpackagemanyhttpsgoPyPI
Malicious code in testpackagemanyhttpsgo (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
At install time, setup.py fetches https://tmpfiles.org/dl/wawHVGgfydD7/6a306c5f03a52.exe via urllib, writes the response to disk, and executes it with os.system("cmd /c start 6a306c5f03a52.exe"). tmpfiles.org is an anonymous, throwaway file-hosting service; the URL is unpinned and unverified, the payload is an opaque Windows executable, and the package's metadata (author and description both equal to the package name) is placeholder content consistent with a throwaway publisher account. Any Windows host running pip install for this package will fetch and execute attacker-controlled bytes automatically, with no opt-in or verification.
During installation, the code attempts to download and start a malicious executable.
Likely related to 2025-08-raknet-testing-package.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-easyaillm
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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obfuscation
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malware
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tool:mshta
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for testpackagemanyhttpsgo (version 2.26). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging testpackagemanyhttpsgo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
testpackagemanyhttpsgo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If testpackagemanyhttpsgo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks testpackagemanyhttpsgo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks testpackagemanyhttpsgo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.