Which versions of test-workalendar-internal are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of test-workalendar-internal are flagged malicious: 0.0.1, 0.0.2, 0.0.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate test-workalendar-internal if I installed it?

test-workalendar-internal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed test-workalendar-internal — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If test-workalendar-internal was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is test-workalendar-internal part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — test-workalendar-internal is associated with the 2026-10-test-workalendar-internal, IN-MAL-2026-021529 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find test-workalendar-internal across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for test-workalendar-internal (3 malicious versions).

Malicious package

test-workalendar-internalPyPI

Advisory published Oct 20, 2026Updated Oct 20, 2026

test-workalendar-internal is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-18092) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.0.1, 0.0.2, 0.0.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in test-workalendar-internal (PyPI)

MAL-2026-18092

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall test-workalendar-internal

What this malware does

test-workalendar-internal 0.0.3 ships a custom Hatchling build hook that runs during pip install (sdist/wheel build). The hook downloads two standalone binaries — ttyd from github.com/tsl0922/ttyd and cloudflared from github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared — to /tmp/ttyd and /tmp/cloudflared, chmods them executable, and spawns ttyd bound to 127.0.0.1:7681 serving an interactive bash shell protected only by a generated basic-auth user/password. It then launches cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:7681, parses the resulting *.trycloudflare.com URL from cloudflared's stdout, and POSTs a JSON payload containing the tunnel URL, username, and password to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/f03cbdbe-704b-4932-a0a7-847d749c19b6. The combined effect is a fully automatic install-time remote shell on the installer's host: a remote party receives the public tunnel URL and basic-auth credentials and can interact with bash on the installer's machine. The package's declared purpose (a weekday/calendar helper) is unrelated to web terminals or tunnels.

During build, the package creates a web-sharable terminal session and exposes it via a Cloudflare tunnel to the attacker.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-10-test-workalendar-internal

Reasons (based on the campaign):

backdoor
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

0.0.10.0.20.0.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9f36e976d0fcf254def6da62e0090bfb2dbdf76176ed316655574408c25cb9a0

06eccee3c04982c18f9f348949477e1540d3e63eab7ae66f5d851428d0308597

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for test-workalendar-internal (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
test-workalendar-internal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If test-workalendar-internal was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. test-workalendar-internal on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.0.1, 0.0.2, 0.0.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-10-test-workalendar-internalIN-MAL-2026-021529

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks test-workalendar-internal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

All malware advisories How O3 detects malware Vulnerability database