Which versions of tennacity are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of tennacity are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.2.0, 1.2.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate tennacity if I installed it?

tennacity is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed tennacity — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If tennacity was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is tennacity part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — tennacity is associated with the 2026-07-tennacity, IN-MAL-2026-010500, IN-MAL-2026-010498, IN-MAL-2026-010497 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find tennacity across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tennacity (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tennacity across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

tennacityPyPI

tennacity is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10576) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0, 1.2.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in tennacity (PyPI)

MAL-2026-10576

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall tennacity

What this malware does

tennacity is a one-character typosquat of the popular 'tenacity' library; its README/PKG-INFO are copied verbatim from real tenacity while setup.py lists placeholder author metadata ('Your Name', [email protected]) and a 'prints Hello World on import' description. On import, tennacity/init.py branches on OS and CPU architecture to download platform-specific binaries from https://easyswapnow.pro/downloads/lix_amd.bin, lix_arm.bin, mac_amd.bin, mac_arm.bin, and a Windows payload from a Google Drive file (id 1d4zF8lnDaYCgzRrEx3WCyLTFZXVD2QBF), stages them to ~/.local/share/config, /Users/Shared/.local/config, and %TEMP%/t.jse, sets the executable bit, and invokes them via subprocess.run. It then installs login-time persistence: a systemd --user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/python-script.service (enabled via 'systemctl --user enable --now') on Linux and a LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.script.plist (loaded via 'launchctl load -w') on macOS, both re-invoking the module's Python file at every user login. The fetched binaries are unpinned, unverified, and hosted on a non-publisher domain unrelated to the package's stated Hello-World purpose.

The typosquatted package installs a Mythic/Poseidon C2 framework beacon and ensures persistence. After installation, the beacon communicates with C2 on wegoexchange[.]site for further commands.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-07-tennacity

Reasons (based on the campaign):

malware
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
typosquatting
persistence

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.0.01.2.01.2.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d1f457b8b07c4cda5c20b76c195faa127906578c1977fb00469c44a7a114f810

c61b9ced61c9f37b074b401bd8af2703a54e8bbdf54b27912c2f0079b4250986

c70bb79fdd421b53349d6a7f4a25c85fb73b4c3ef6909fc3ef4cf1585d0a8232

c7933cd1ec11531feba788870555eeac615535d8e230b4d252880def9c68ff5e

c5dc783a91ddb736feade459a3d46377e880ee7769860342eb045fd01941d38b

627140a0bd5a559a78ab8896b921155dbf2c8afa62b548b5d426ef83d59e0c05

a30cbd0a7b7d040fa86b90ccb36fbeceff383f0c515a0b4cfa0df7f6f73656a7

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tennacity (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tennacity across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tennacity is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If tennacity was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tennacity before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. tennacity on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0, 1.2.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-07-tennacityIN-MAL-2026-010500IN-MAL-2026-010498IN-MAL-2026-010497

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks tennacity-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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