Which versions of tdata-grabber are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of tdata-grabber are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate tdata-grabber if I installed it?

tdata-grabber is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed tdata-grabber — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If tdata-grabber was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is tdata-grabber part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — tdata-grabber is associated with the 2026-06-telegramlite, IN-MAL-2026-007770 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find tdata-grabber across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tdata-grabber (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tdata-grabber across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

tdata-grabberPyPI

Malicious code in tdata-grabber (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6560

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall tdata-grabber

What this malware does

Package name explicitly declares its purpose as harvesting Telegram Desktop session data (tdata directory). The tdata folder contains live authenticated Telegram session keys; collecting and exfiltrating it enables full account takeover of the installer's Telegram account by whoever receives the data. Automated tracing of the package contents engaged but its output was withheld by the provider's malware-content safety filter — a signal consistent with the file contents reading as operational session-stealer code. Combined with the self-declared purpose in the package name, the package fits the messaging-session-theft fingerprint (active-attack) rather than any legitimate library shape.

Package exfiltrates data from the Telegram application to a remote location, effectively collecting Telegram sessions.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-telegramlite

Reasons (based on the campaign):

target:telegram
files-exfiltration

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6aa5184e991d29d6a751e13971ce2ce6a1cec834f675a1c3dd5eb0fc2ec75762

9b4c3b37df5e3d08d7bc6ad736e0231ed0dc655640ffdf0dc403f4029ace2787

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tdata-grabber (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tdata-grabber across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tdata-grabber is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If tdata-grabber was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tdata-grabber before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. tdata-grabber on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-telegramliteIN-MAL-2026-007770

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks tdata-grabber-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring