Which versions of tarsie are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of tarsie are flagged malicious: 912.6. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate tarsie if I installed it?

tarsie is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed tarsie — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If tarsie was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is tarsie part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — tarsie is associated with the 2024-11-byted-dast campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find tarsie across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tarsie (version 912.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tarsie across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

tarsiePyPI

Malicious code in tarsie (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2024-10463

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall tarsie

What this malware does

A campaign of probably pentest packages flooding PYPI. Installing the package or importing the module triggers reporting basic info like hostname, path and the username to the package author. There is no other purpose of the package.

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: 2024-11-byted-dast

Reasons (based on the campaign):

The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
typosquatting
dependency-confusion

The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'tarsie' @ 912.6 (pypi) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

912.6

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9618ced36c097ad2f41f7ab9d7298a6424c1bcb84fa50942e513f2ee4893a145

435bc4339cf36802345dfd375d50d0f6c7092f60bc089222c5810c55596d556b

7cda2e4cbf94525414cf406db6dbbb3ba0afedd8327f1ceff04f82932fefeca3

6b53471f95936e73120b550832dac831dbc7589b70ccad6430dc8be571ffe61e

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for tarsie (version 912.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging tarsie across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
tarsie is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If tarsie was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks tarsie before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. tarsie on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 912.6 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2024-11-byted-dast

References

bad-packages.kam193.eu

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193)
OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks tarsie-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring