Which versions of syncagents are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of syncagents are flagged malicious: 1.0.1, 1.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate syncagents if I installed it?

syncagents is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed syncagents — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If syncagents was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is syncagents part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — syncagents is associated with the 2026-06-syncagents, IN-MAL-2026-007034, IN-MAL-2026-007033 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find syncagents across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for syncagents (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging syncagents across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

syncagentsPyPI

Malicious code in syncagents (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6083

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall syncagents

What this malware does

The PyPI package 'syncagents' impersonates the legitimate PyPI package 'agentsync' — the README, PKG-INFO, CHANGELOG, and project URLs all point at pypi.org/project/agentsync/, the shipped Python module is named 'agentsync', and the Python source is a verbatim clone of upstream agentsync (the README itself notes 'syncagents' as an npm-side name, not a PyPI name). On top of that clone, the package force-includes an undocumented 2,905,600-byte Windows native module at src/agentsync/_parser.pyd. src/agentsync/init.py lines 29-37 load this DLL at import time via ctypes.CDLL, wrapped in a bare try/except so any failure is silently swallowed, with a 'Load native parser for performance' comment as cover. The Python implementation (render.py / core.py) never references _parser.pyd — the DLL is unreachable from the package's advertised functionality, contradicting the README's 'Zero dependencies. Nothing to audit' claim. Any Windows host that runs pip install syncagents followed by import agentsync (the name suggested by the cloned documentation, increasing the chance of accidental import via typo) will execute the DLL's DllMain with attacker-controlled native code. The combination of (a) name-squat against an established package with cloned cover content, (b) a large undocumented native binary unreferenced by the package's own Python code, and (c) a silenced import-time loader is a deliberate covert payload-delivery pattern.

During import, package loads embedded native extension module. This library hooks on loading, spawns a new system process and likely attempts to inject the encrypted payload in it for further execution (T1055.012). The code uses heavy analysis evasion techniques. Decrypted payload revealed capabilities to steal all kind of credentials (browsers data, AI tools, env variables, SSH keys, ...), inject code to redirect cryptocurrency transactions, spy-like activities (screenshots, keylogger) and worm-like activities using discovered GitHub tokens to publish malicious code into CI. It establishes persistence in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe and also attempts to perform lateral movement in Kubernetes and AWS environments.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-syncagents

Reasons (based on the campaign):

native-extension
infostealer
worm
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-credentials
uses-telegram-bot
keylogger
clipboard-stealing
exfiltration-ssh-keys
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
obfuscation
exfiltration-browser-data
exfiltration-env-variables
persistence

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.0.11.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

ab19812d31784aada2fb7c8165db286c96871bd8645568766ffc22c070fd3bf2

496beb0a339bc38954918b1a59e126149d1570a5f38834578f058ca4f831afa4

aebf468a6887fb09002d4ae4aceab77e347034b389b02e252844f7d0d81fabd6

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for syncagents (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging syncagents across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
syncagents is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If syncagents was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks syncagents before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. syncagents on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-syncagentsIN-MAL-2026-007034IN-MAL-2026-007033

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks syncagents-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring