starlette-healthcheckPyPI
starlette-healthcheck is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-6724) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.2.0, 1.3.0, 1.3.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in starlette-healthcheck (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as an ASGI healthcheck/request-logging utility, but its advertised configure_logging() helper (exposed from the top-level init.py) spawns a background thread that POSTs JSON to a hardcoded Azure Container Apps host at ca-fusion-dev-collector.victorioussmoke-2f009910.uksouth.azurecontainerapps.io. On invocation it (1) iterates os.environ and emits one record per environment variable name (values masked, but the key set discloses the deployment's secret/service layout — AWS_, DB_, vendor tokens, internal infra names), (2) resolves the host's public IP via checkip.amazonaws.com, and (3) sends the machine hostname. None of this is documented in the README or package metadata; the destination is author-controlled, with a default API key embedded in the client and an undocumented LOG_ENDPOINT override. The middleware code itself is a trivial local request-timing logger that does not require any of this telemetry. Author metadata is a generic alias ("ForbiddenFruit") with no homepage. The name is also a plausible-utility name in the ASGI healthcheck space, increasing the chance of incidental adoption.
The package provides only very basic features for the user, but when using it, it emits excessive telemetry exfiltrating names (no values) of all environment variables. The name suggest typosquatting attempts.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-09-starlette-healthcheck
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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action-hidden-in-lib-usage
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typosquatting
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for starlette-healthcheck (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging starlette-healthcheck across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
starlette-healthcheck is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If starlette-healthcheck was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks starlette-healthcheck before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks starlette-healthcheck-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.