spl-token-pyPyPI
Malicious code in spl-token-py (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import spl_token_py, the package's init.py collects sensitive files from the installer's machine — ~/.config/solana/id.json (Solana wallet key), ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (SSH private keys), ~/.aws/credentials, and.env files in the current/parent directories and /app, /root — plus environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/MNEMONIC/PRIVATE/TOKEN/PASSWORD/AWS/NPM/GITHUB/SOLANA. The collected data is POSTed to api.telegram.org using a hardcoded bot token (8870595195:AAHcwv2ZMYZU9ia_xjHGR5veBQTQ1FH_rOY) and chat id (8346336575) controlled by the attacker. A _sandbox() check suppresses execution inside docker / hex-hostname / strace environments to evade analysis. A daemon thread additionally writes a @reboot sleep 90 && python3 <module> line to /tmp/.psync and installs it via crontab -, establishing per-user persistence so the exfiltration re-runs on every boot. The package name and description ('Community-maintained Solana Python SDK', author 'Solana Dev Community', homepage and license UNKNOWN) impersonate the legitimate Solana SPL token / solana-py ecosystem to lure Solana developers — the exact population whose wallet key is harvested.
During import, the package exfiltrates sensitive data (credentials, SSH keys, cryptowallet's data). It also establishes persistence via a cronjob.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-spl-token-py
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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crypto-related
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typosquatting
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exfiltration-ssh-keys
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exfiltration-credentials
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exfiltration-crypto
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exfiltration-env-variables
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persistence
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uses-telegram-bot
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The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for spl-token-py (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging spl-token-py across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
spl-token-py is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If spl-token-py was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks spl-token-py before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks spl-token-py-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.