solidity-devPyPI
solidity-dev is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10194) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.3.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in solidity-dev (PyPI)
What this malware does
solidity_dev/init.py contains a large base64-encoded Linux x86_64 ELF binary in _PAYLOAD_B64. On import solidity_dev, the module decodes the blob, writes it to disk with executable permissions via os/stat/shutil, and spawns it through subprocess. The dropped ELF references installer-owned wallet and key material paths (~/.ethereum/keystore, ~/.foundry/keystores, ~/.config/solana/id.json), browser wallet extensions (metamask, phantom, ledger), and BIP-39 / mnemonic / seed keyword scanning (including Spanish variants semilla, frase, clave, billetera), and uploads collected material to attacker-controlled destinations including api.pinata.cloud/pinning/pinFileToIPFS (with pinata_api_key / pinata_secret_api_key headers), ugu.se/upload, temp.sh, and transfer.sh. The binary also installs a cron entry (0 */12 * * *) via crontab -l |... | crontab -, giving the operator scheduled re-execution on the host. The package advertises 'Solidity development helpers' but ships no Solidity-related code — the name is a cover story for the dropper.
The package embeds an executable stealing cryptocurrency wallets data. During import, code saves the executable under a name suggesting system utility and configures cron to run it periodically. The exfiltrated data is encrypted using embedded RSA code before uploading to file-sharing services or IPFS.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-py-base58
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
crypto-related
-
exfiltration-crypto
-
persistence
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solidity-dev (version 1.3.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solidity-dev across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solidity-dev is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solidity-dev was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solidity-dev before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks solidity-dev-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.