Which versions of solana-web3-py are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of solana-web3-py are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate solana-web3-py if I installed it?

solana-web3-py is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed solana-web3-py — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If solana-web3-py was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is solana-web3-py part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — solana-web3-py is associated with the 2026-06-spl-token-py, IN-MAL-2026-005417 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find solana-web3-py across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-web3-py (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-web3-py across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

solana-web3-pyPyPI

Malicious code in solana-web3-py (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5338

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall solana-web3-py

What this malware does

Malicious typosquat impersonating the legitimate Solana Python SDK (solana / solana-py) and the JS @solana/web3.js. The package ships no SDK functionality; the only behavior is credential theft. On import, init.py reads installer secrets including ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/solana/id.json, /.solana/id.json, and.env files at./,../, /app/, /root/, and scrapes environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/MNEMONIC/PRIVATE/TOKEN/PASSWORD/AWS/NPM/GITHUB/SOLANA. The collected payload is POSTed to a hardcoded Telegram bot (api.telegram.org sendMessage with bot token 8870595195:... and chat_id 8346336575). On non-Windows hosts, _persist() writes /tmp/.psync containing a @reboot sleep 90 && python3 <init> cron line and registers it via crontab -, ensuring the credential dropper re-runs on every reboot even after the package is uninstalled. The Solana wallet key path (/.config/solana/id.json) is explicitly targeted, confirming a wallet-theft motive.

During import, the package exfiltrates sensitive data (credentials, SSH keys, cryptowallet's data). It also establishes persistence via a cronjob.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-spl-token-py

Reasons (based on the campaign):

crypto-related
typosquatting
exfiltration-ssh-keys
exfiltration-credentials
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-env-variables
persistence
uses-telegram-bot
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6945b0bfcf3be9438852411527a75d1275367ca7a34ea4a28793e6e0c6258ccb

af1a2f1a7c7e3bddb9c8d2fcb8a4c86a6755763c94b95b1eddb81f382318c432

1f72c1dc1aed115ba88633a78b3565ae78ca5bd0e62b5ffa0f022404e5cba976

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-web3-py (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-web3-py across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solana-web3-py is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solana-web3-py was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solana-web3-py before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. solana-web3-py on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-spl-token-pyIN-MAL-2026-005417

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks solana-web3-py-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring