Which versions of solana-web3 are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of solana-web3 are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate solana-web3 if I installed it?

solana-web3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed solana-web3 — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If solana-web3 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is solana-web3 part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — solana-web3 is associated with the 2026-06-spl-token-py, IN-MAL-2026-005416 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find solana-web3 across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-web3 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-web3 across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

solana-web3PyPI

Malicious code in solana-web3 (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5337

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall solana-web3

What this malware does

On import, solana-web3/init.py executes a credential-stealer payload. After a sandbox-evasion gate (checks for 12-hex Docker hostname, /.dockerenv, and presence of strace to skip analysis environments), _collect() reads installer-side secrets: ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, Solana keypairs at ~/.config/solana/id.json and ~/.solana/id.json,.env files in the current and parent directories as well as /app/.env and /root/.env, and bulk-scrapes os.environ for any variable name containing KEY/SECRET/MNEMONIC/PRIVATE/TOKEN/PASSWORD/AWS/NPM/GITHUB/SOLANA. The harvested data is POSTed to https://api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage using a hardcoded bot token and chat_id 8346336575. _persist() then writes @reboot sleep 90 && python3 <__file__> into /tmp/.psync and merges it into the user's crontab so the stealer re-runs on every reboot, even after the package is uninstalled. The package name impersonates the well-known @solana/web3.js Solana SDK and advertises itself as a 'Community-maintained Solana Python SDK', but ships no SDK functionality — only the stealer. METADATA lists UNKNOWN homepage/license and a generic 'Solana Dev Community' author.

During import, the package exfiltrates sensitive data (credentials, SSH keys, cryptowallet's data). It also establishes persistence via a cronjob.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-spl-token-py

Reasons (based on the campaign):

crypto-related
typosquatting
exfiltration-ssh-keys
exfiltration-credentials
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-env-variables
persistence
uses-telegram-bot
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

91c09b86579a07d271d3bcd57adf5b5b161e49e36c3bd7af09c50dd8127aa54f

4967ebad2d1f4f5802ef50f1d399c05c4dfab94a208079695570b15ffef0fdd2

d413be5ab63f611c2afc6583df30b5167044189a3c1c9248cc9c3910a77bb974

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-web3 (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-web3 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solana-web3 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solana-web3 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solana-web3 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. solana-web3 on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-spl-token-pyIN-MAL-2026-005416

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks solana-web3-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring