Which versions of solana-cli-py are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of solana-cli-py are flagged malicious: 1.0.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate solana-cli-py if I installed it?

solana-cli-py is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed solana-cli-py — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If solana-cli-py was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is solana-cli-py part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — solana-cli-py is associated with the 2026-06-spl-token-py, IN-MAL-2026-005467 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find solana-cli-py across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-cli-py (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-cli-py across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

solana-cli-pyPyPI

Malicious code in solana-cli-py (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5336

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall solana-cli-py

What this malware does

On import solana_cli_py, the package's top-level __init__.py unconditionally invokes _report(), which harvests standard developer-side secret material and POSTs it to a hardcoded Telegram bot. Targeted paths include ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, the Solana wallet keypairs ~/.config/solana/id.json and ~/.solana/id.json, and .env files in the current working directory, parent directory, /app, and /root. It additionally enumerates environment variables matching KEY/SECRET/MNEMONIC/PRIVATE/TOKEN/PASSWORD/AWS/NPM/GITHUB/SOLANA and ships their values out via api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage to chat id 8346336575. A background daemon thread then writes @reboot sleep 90 && python3 <abs path to __init__.py> into /tmp/.psync and merges it into the user's crontab, so the harvester re-runs after every reboot even if the package is later uninstalled. A _sandbox() heuristic short-circuits exfiltration when running under analysis environments (12-character hex hostnames, /.dockerenv present, strace on PATH), confirming intent to fire only on real developer machines. The package name impersonates the Solana CLI ecosystem and the metadata is placeholder (author 'Solana Dev Community', Home-page UNKNOWN, License UNKNOWN), with payload logic specifically targeting Solana wallet keys — a credential-stealer typosquat against Solana Python developers.

During import, the package exfiltrates sensitive data (credentials, SSH keys, cryptowallet's data). It also establishes persistence via a cronjob.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-06-spl-token-py

Reasons (based on the campaign):

crypto-related
typosquatting
exfiltration-ssh-keys
exfiltration-credentials
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-env-variables
persistence
uses-telegram-bot
The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d1906f26c40e0ea91316c6c85ba5fea16d52a711c7a5edf3d847578cdd653715

80ee640ddeeacc31a125ec0fcc11dcb5f9a23e18f5ed003ce2dfcb1de8bbe1dd

5d07ef5740adcb537ab7c34647a0250184d417ad6398dcbaa3b54da79533461f

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for solana-cli-py (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging solana-cli-py across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
solana-cli-py is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If solana-cli-py was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks solana-cli-py before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. solana-cli-py on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-06-spl-token-pyIN-MAL-2026-005467

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter

Detect & block this

O3 blocks solana-cli-py-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring