Which versions of renderctx are malicious?

The following PyPI versions of renderctx are flagged malicious: 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 2.1.0, 2.1.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate renderctx if I installed it?

renderctx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed renderctx — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If renderctx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is renderctx part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — renderctx is associated with the 2026-04-renderctx campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find renderctx across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for renderctx (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging renderctx across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

renderctxPyPI

Malicious code in renderctx (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-3207

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

pip uninstall renderctx

What this malware does

Packages in this campaign are used to exfiltrate data from users installing code from prepared Github repositories. Packages contain code to exfiltrate files (typically .env files, but it could also be log, txt or code files), and may also create a persistent backdoor via embedding a hardcoded SSH key or perform other actions. The malicious actions are not triggered via the code in malicious repositories pretending to be some early-stage cryptocurrency-related projects.

Based on the attribution of some NPM packages used in malicious repositories published under https://github.com/0xsebasneuron, this is likely part of North Korean actions targeting developers via fake interviews: https://socket.dev/supply-chain-attacks/north-korea-s-contagious-interview-campaign

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-04-renderctx

Reasons (based on the campaign):

backdoor
files-exfiltration
crypto-related
The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package

Malicious versions

6 flagged

0.1.00.1.11.1.11.1.22.1.02.1.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

7833d0bd5322d30c08f0ae2209ffa944492dcf2862c69f937da28b0da8bbfc90

54809989a9ec8863af596061f65d10d8a896c3c1df13a2e355fd0ac62df9569e

ce6c1edc6a33a6d5f25c41a8b992646504187dcde8e50578f64fd57bade63a35

7c668f58ae62e49c301d2e437e96818f41e221768509cfb4cf80b9800b5adf5a

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for renderctx (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging renderctx across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
renderctx is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If renderctx was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks renderctx before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. renderctx on PyPI has been identified as a malicious package (versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 2.1.0, 2.1.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

2026-04-renderctx

References

Credits

Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst

Detect & block this

O3 blocks renderctx-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring