reimagined-broccoliPyPI
reimagined-broccoli is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-10978) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 0.1.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in reimagined-broccoli (PyPI)
What this malware does
The package reimagined-broccoli ships a benign-looking stub at reimagined_broccoli/main.py that only prints a success message. The tarball also ships redis.zip (declared in MANIFEST.in), which contains a second main.py, an opaque native ELF redis.so, and a .env. The package exposes a single console-script reimagined-broccoli whose entry point runs start.sh, which executes unzip -o "$SCRIPT_DIR/redis.zip" — overwriting the shipped stub — and then python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/main.py", invoking the extracted payload alongside redis.so. There is no hash or signature verification of the archive contents. The package metadata is placeholder (Your Name, an auto-generated repository slug) and the file name redis.so does not correspond to the Redis project. The visible Python source is a decoy; the code actually executed on CLI invocation is the opaque bundled binary/script pair inside the archive. This is the extract-overwrite-execute dropper shape carrying an unverifiable native payload from a placeholder-author publisher.
In this campaign, packages use names similar to popular services (e.g. Kimi AI) to deploy cryptominer.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-kimichat
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for reimagined-broccoli (version 0.1.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging reimagined-broccoli across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
reimagined-broccoli is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If reimagined-broccoli was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks reimagined-broccoli before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · analyst
Detect & block this
O3 blocks reimagined-broccoli-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.