query-profilePyPI
Malicious code in query-profile (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
This package's metadata and README openly declare it as a dependency-confusion proof-of-concept that registers a PyPI name referenced in Apple's ml-health-query-profiles tutorial. The current payload is inert: init.py only sets version and main.py prints a notice — no network calls, no subprocess execution, no file or credential access at install or import time. However, anyone following the upstream tutorial that references this package name would silently pull this PoC into their environment. Although the present version is benign, the registered name occupies a namespace slot that a third party referenced, and any future version published under this name would automatically reach those installers. Routing to human review so an adjudicator can decide whether the PoC nature warrants a public advisory and whether the upstream tutorial reference needs coordination.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
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The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'query-profile' @ 0.0.3 (pypi) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for query-profile (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging query-profile across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
query-profile is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If query-profile was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks query-profile before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks query-profile-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.