pystylishPyPI
Malicious code in pystylish (PyPI) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On import pystylish, the package's init.py spawns a daemon thread that downloads a Windows executable from https://goy.mikoz.xyz/boh3.exe, writes it to %TEMP%/vcredist_x86.exe (disguised as the Microsoft Visual C++ runtime installer), and executes it via subprocess.Popen. The domain is unrelated to the package's stated purpose (a terminal color/fade library) and is not a publisher-controlled host. To evade local DNS controls, the loader resolves the C2 domain through DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1/dns-query and dns.google/resolve), then connects to the resolved IP with a manual Host header so /etc/hosts entries and sinkholes are bypassed. Error paths print a fake Failed to connect to discord.com:80 message regardless of the actual destination, providing cover for the unrelated outbound traffic. The package is a typosquat/clone of the legitimate pystyle library by billythegoat356 — README still points at github.com/billythegoat356/pystyle while the package is published under the name pystylish, and the library API is copied verbatim from pystyle with the dropper appended. Any developer who installs and imports pystylish (including transitively) will silently fetch and run an attacker-controlled binary on Windows.
Clone of a legitimate package. During import, the code downloads and executes a malicious executable.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-pystylish
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote executable.
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malware
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clones-real-package
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pystylish (version 2.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pystylish across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pystylish is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pystylish was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pystylish before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pystylish-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.