pylogxoPyPI
pylogxo is a confirmed malicious PyPI package (MAL-2026-5679) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.3, 1.0.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pylogxo (PyPI)
What this malware does
On import pylogx, the package spawns a background thread that sleeps 5-20 seconds, force-installs sensitive third-party packages (cryptography, pycryptodomex, secretstorage, opencv-python, pillow, psutil) via pip, then fetches a base64-encoded blob from http://69.164.245.166/payload.txt over plaintext HTTP and passes the decoded bytes to exec() with a synthetic __name__ = "__payload__". The destination is a bare IP with no TLS, no pinning, and no signature verification, so any code the operator of that host serves runs in the importing process. The pre-installed dependency set (secretstorage + cryptography) is consistent with a follow-on credential / keyring harvester. The package is also distributed under the name pylogxo while installing the import name pylogx — a near-edit of legitimate logging library names — and ships placeholder metadata (empty README, https://github.com/example/pylogx, [email protected]) and references submodules (formatter, handlers) that do not exist in the tarball, so the module will ImportError only after the dropper thread has already fired. There is no legitimate reason for a logging utility to fetch and execute remote code at import time.
During import, the package downloads and executes remote code being an infostealer.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-06-pylogxo
Reasons (based on the campaign):
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Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
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infostealer
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The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.
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exfiltration-credentials
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exfiltration-browser-data
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files-exfiltration
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for pylogxo (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging pylogxo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
pylogxo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If pylogxo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks pylogxo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) · reporter
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pylogxo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.